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sumption of coverage might have the salutary effect of causing insurance companies to clarify the provisions as to the effective date; i.e., the agent would be
instructed to be certain that applicants understand the effective date to be after
the medical examination. The applicant would be covered in situations 3 and 4
if the agreed effective date were either the date of the application and premium
payment or the date of satisfactory completion of the medical examination.
As Judge Clark points out in his concurring opinion in the Gaunt case, "a result placed not squarely upon inequity, but upon interpretation, seems sure to
produce continuing uncertainty in the law of insurance contracts."' 8 His position points the way to more expeditious handling of a perplexing problem.

EFFECT OF ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT ON
QUANTITY DISCOUNTS
In a proceeding initiated under the Robinson-Patman amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act," the Federal Trade Commission charged the Morton
Salt Company with illegal discriminations in price between different customers.
The company had established openly announced quantity and cumulative discounts:2 i) a quantity discount of $.io per case from the list price of $i.6o
granted to all customers who purchased Blue Package Table Salt in carload
lots; 2) an additional $.io per case cumulative rebate to customers purchasing
5,000-50,000 cases of Blue Package salt in any consecutive 12-month period, or

a $.i 5 rebate to purchasers of more than 5o,ooo cases; 3) a 5 per cent cumulative
rebate on all table salt other than the Blue Package varieties to customers whose
total salt purchases during a 12-month period exceeded $5o,ooo. After a full
hearing, the Commission ordered the company to cease and desist from discriminating in price between customers.3 On petition for review, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals set aside this order and dismissed the complaint. Morton Salt
Co. v. FTC.4
A major weakness of the Clayton Act's prohibition of price discrimination
prior to 1936 was the express exception of quantity discounts from the statute's
sanctions, even though such discounts might reflect a windfall for favored large
1S

i6o F. 2d 599, 6o3 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).

149 Stat.

1526

(1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (1941).

2Quantity discounts are granted on individual orders exceeding the base quantity, so that

they may normally be determined when the order is placed. Cumulative discounts are based on
the total volume of a buyer's purchases over a given period of time, and are therefore usually
given in the form of retroactive rebates.
3 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944).
4 i62 F. 2d 949 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947), cert. granted 68 S. Ct. 355(1948), noted in Quantity
Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 556 (1947); 6o Harv. L. Rev.
1167 (1947)-
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6
customers.s In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, a large price differential
based on a relatively small saving in cost arising from quantity purchases was
held legal under the old Act. The primary purpose of the amendment of Section
27 to form the new Section 2(a) was to close off this loophole by revising the exception to include only quantity discounts justified by actual savings in cost
due to the larger quantities sold or delivered. 8 The intended effect of the new
Act was recognized by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a dictum in the
Goodyear case,9 and was apparently adhered to by the FTC and by those companies charged by the Commission with illegal quantity or cumulative discounts. Between passage of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Morton Salt
case, no cease and desist order based on such practiceso was ever challenged in
the federal courts.

s "That it shall be unlawful for any person .... to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities .... where the effect of such discrimination, may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of
commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity
sold." 38 Stat. 730 (1914), iS U.S.C.A. § 13 (1928) (italics added).
6 ioi F. 2d 620 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939).
7The House Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting the Robinson-Patman Act, stated:
....

present Section 2 of the Clayton Act ....

places no limit upon quantity differentials

of any kind ..... This proviso is of great importance, for. . . . it also limits the use of quantity
price differentials to the sphere of actual cost differences. Otherwise, such differentials would
become instruments of favor and privilege and weapons of competitive oppression.
"In the above exemption the phrase 'which make only due allowance,' is carried over from
the present act, but as coupled with the remainder of the clause, is here extended to limit
quantity differentials to differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, and delivery as provided
in said subsection (2)." H. Rep. 2287, 74 th Cong. 2d Sess., at 9 (I936).
The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary commented: "The weakness of
present Section 2 lies principally in the fact that: (i) It places no limit upon differentials permissible on account of differences in quantity." S. Rep. 1502, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., at 4 (1936).
8As amended, the statute reads:
"It shall be unlawful for any person .... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality .... where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, That nothing contained [herein] shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantity in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (i94i).
9 ". . . . it is made clear by the declaration of the several Committees of the Congress and

the history of the section, that the amendment incorporated in the Robinson-Patman Act
marks a change in the law and not mere clarification." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC,
iox F. 2d 62o, 624 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939); cf. Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price
Laws, c. IX (937); Crowley, Equal Price Treatment Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 306, 327 (947); Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patman Act,
25 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 161-67 (1941); Smith, The Patman Act in Practice, 35 Mich. L. Rev.
705, 710-2r (1937); The Robinson-Patman Act in Action, 46 Yale LJ. 447, 455-62 (1937).
1o Ferro Enamel Corp., CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 13,362 (FTC, 1946); John B. Stetson Co.,

CCH Trade Reg. Serv.

13,290

(FTC, 1945); Caradine Hat Co., 39 F.T.C. 86 (1944); Na-
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The court's decision to set aside the FTC order in the instant case was based
on the theory that the Commission had not met its burden of proving a statutory violation. Under the court's construction of the Robinson-Patman Act, the
Commission must show a differential in price between customers, consequent
likelihood of injury to competition, and lack of justification for such differential
in cost savings. Since this interpretation conflicts with the plain language of the
Act as well as its interpretation by other federal courts, both the court's reasoning and decision are difficult to justify.
Although the necessity for a showing of discrimination by the FTC is universally accepted, differences in the interpretation of the word "discrimination"
lessen this apparent unanimity. The majority decision in the Morton Salt case
distinguished between "discrimination" and "differentiation," stating that the
former

".

.. . occurs as a matter of law only when Section 2(a) of the Clayton

Act, as amended, is in fact violated."" According to this view, proof of a discrimination would certainly require the showing of price differentiations resulting in injury to, destruction of, or prevention of competition with any person who receives or grants the price differential. In addition, it would probably
be necessary to prove that the differential did not make "due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered." '

2

However, Section 2(a) declares "It shall be unlawful ....
price ....

to discriminate in

where the effect of such discriminationmay be substantially to lessen

competition." This language implies that "discrimination in price" may exist
without any, showing of an effect on competition. The implication was substantiated by Chairman Utterback of the House Committee in charge of the Robinson-Patman Act:
In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more than a mere difference.
Underlying the meaning ....

is the idea that some relationship exists between the

parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the
difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other. If the
two are competing in .... resale .... that relationship exists."3
Writers and courts, among them the Seventh Circuit Court prior to the present
case, have uniformly dealt with discrimination as a mere price difference betional Biscuit Co:, 38 F.T.C. 213 (x944); Dentists' Supply Co., 37 F.T.C. 345 (1943); SherwinWilliams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25 (x94,3); Life Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472 (I941); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1209 (i94o); Standard Brands Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1117 (i94o); Simmons Co.,
29 F.T.C. 727 (939); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 186 (1939); American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. i69 (i939); Master Lock
Co., 27 F.T.C. 982 (1938); H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938).
11Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F. 2d 949, 955 (I947).
12 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 1 U.S.C.A. § 13 (I94i).
5
'3 8o Cong. Rec. 9416 (i936).
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tween competing purchasers, treating the effect on competition and possible
justification as separate entities.X4 Thus Judge Minton, dissenting in the Morton
Salt case, more accurately concluded: "If I, a small buyer of salt, have to pay
more for my salt than a.larger buyer does because he is a large buyer, it seems
clear to me that I have been discriminated against as to price." s Judge Minton
recognized, as the majority did not, that the presence of a discrimination is a
question distinct from that of its illegality.
Another element which the court treated as essential to proof of violation of
the Act was an adverse effect on competition caused by the alleged discrimination. Assuming that the court was correct in requiring FTC proof of such an effect, the degree of proof demanded by no means accords with the standards
established in other decisions in the same field, despite the majority's efforts
to reconcile its stand with previous holdings. Thus, the court emphasized that
the discounts were not used to reduce the sale price of the product. 6 In doing
so, it read into the Robinson-Patman Act a requirement that actual injury to
competition must be shown. 7 Yet the Supreme Court had flatly rejected this
argument in Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC:
But it is asserted that there is no evidence that the allowances ever were reflected
in the purchasers' resale prices. This argument loses sight of the statutory command.
As we have said, the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact
have harmed competition, but only that there is a reasonable possibility that they
'4 Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v.
FTC, 148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945), cert. den. 326 U.S. 734 (1945), rehearing den. 326
U.S. 809 (1945); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 144 F. 2d 221 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944), rev'd on
other grounds 324 U.S. 746 (i945); Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 144 F. 2d 211
(C.C.A. 7th, i944); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. 2d 763 (C.C.A. 7th, 193o)
(under old Clayton Act); Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws 75 (937);
Quantity Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 556 (1947); 6o Harv. L.
Rev. i167 (947), noting the instant case; Crowley, Equal Price Treatment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 3o6, 325 (T947); Smith, The Patman Act in Practice,
35 Mich. L. Rev. 705, 711 (1937). Compare Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 131, 134 (1941), suggesting substitute terminology to avoid confusion
in terms.

Is
Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F. 2d 949, 959 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947).
6"The discount was not used to reduce the sale price of the product ..... Any businessman would readily admit that to some degree the price paid by a competitor for a product
sold by [sic] him affects his business, but that is far from establishing that such price differential would force either of them to re-sell at a substantially reduced profit or to refrain from
re-selling ..... This does not inferentially establish that the competitive position of either of
them is being or may be injured, or that competition in the wholesale or retail business in the
same line of commerce in general is being or may be injured or that the price differentials in
question actually affect or may affect the competitive re-sale fluctuations in the trade." Ibid.,
at 956.
'7

Although the court painstakingly referred to the "likelihood" or "threat" of injury, its

reasoning and decision are consistent only with the stricter requirement of actual adverse
effect on competition. The setting aside of the cease and desist order is even less understand-

able in light of the ample evidence of actual competitive harm contained in the record. See
brief of respondent at p. 9.
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"may" have such an effect ..... tilt was permissible for the Commission to infer that
these discriminatory allowances were a substantial threat to competition.'
In fact, the Seventl Circuit Court of Appeals itself, in Judge Lindley's majority
opinion in the Corn Products case, adopted a position contrary to that of the
Morton Salt decision.19
The requirement of actual damage would, if generally accepted, defeat the
purpose of the Act. It would allow proceedings by the Commission only if a
Morton customer might be found willing to reflect, in his resale price, the higher
purchase price paid for salt, so that the Commission might point to his actual
loss of customers as a basis for its findings. But the very reason for the Commission's power to issue cease and desist orders is to prevent harm to competition; to refuse to allow action on the basis of probable future harm would be
anomalous. For this reason, this same court, in the Corn Productscase, had used
the standard that there need be only "reasonable probability" that an adverse
effect on competition would result:
The statute does not require proof of actual injury ..... It is the congressional
intent to halt in its incipiency any possible injury to the public before it may have ac2
tually weakened the fabric of fair competition. 0
Judge Minton's dissent in the instant case diverged even further from the
majority than does the generally accepted "reasonable probability" doctrine.
After pointing out that proof of actual injury was not essential to support the
FTC order, the judge continued, "The quantity discounts .... are discriminatory and may have the effect denounced by the statute. The fact of the discrimination itself, it seems to me, would have supported an inference that the
effect may be to lessen competition. " 2 This view would lighten considerably the
task of the FTC; yet it is justifiable in a case like the present, involving cumulative discounts. Salt forms only a small portion of the wholesale and retail
grocery business, so that the customer discriminated against may not be able to
show actual loss of trade even if he does not absorb the price differential. However, salt is the business of the Morton Company, and unjustified discounts to
large buyers are no less reprehensible than discrimination between purchasers
where the product represents a large part of the customers' trade.
Although here a .... price differential .... might not alone have been sufficient
to give the [large] buyer.. :. an appreciable competitive advantage in all of its busi.
18 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). Contra: Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F. 2d 265, 269-70
(C.C.A. 1st, 1937) (under old Clayton Act).
19Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, i44 F. 2d 211, 218 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944).
20 Ibid., at 21 5 . Accord: Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945);
cf. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922).
21Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F. 2d 949, 960 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947). Contrast Judge
Minton's earlier statement in A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F. 2d 453, 455 (C.C.A. 7th,
1943): "But it takes discrimination plus the other element as to substantially lessening competition, or tending to create a monopoly, to sustain the complaint. The latter elements are
not conclusions to be drawn from the facts of discrimination. They are essential additional elements of fact that must be proved and incorporated in the findings."
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ness, yet an accumulation of several such discounts from many sellers of different commodities, each alone of no effect, would give such buyer a decided competitive ad2
vantage. If one such discount cannot be prohibited, none can. 2
* The third aspect of the case, the court's decision as to what the FTC must
sustain as its burden of proof, has provoked most comment.2 3 Section 2(b) of
the Act provides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price ....the burden of rebutting the prima-facie
case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a
violation of this section, and unless justification shall be aflirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination.4
By distorting the concept of "discrimination" to include proof of all the elements of Section 2(a), plus disproof of the applicability of the provisos of that
section, the majority opinion effectively nullified Section 2(b) as a procedural
aid to the Commission. Such distortion resulted in the extreme position, never
before taken by any court, that the Commission must prove i) a difference in
price between competing purchasers 2) which has produced an adverse effect
on competition and 3) which does not make due allowance for cost differences.
This position is justified neither by the literal meaning of the statute nor by
precedent.
Application of the earlier definition of "discrimination" would require the
FTC to establish only a price difference between competitors in order to shift
the burden of proof to the person charged with violating the statute. The latter
party would then have to prove either the lack of effect on competition, justification on the ground that the differential reflected differences in cost, or an honest
attempt to meet a competitor's lower price.2s This interpretation has been approved by several writers26 and was adopted by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Samuel H. Moss, Inc., v. FTC07 where the court supported its stand
with a justification based both on its literal interpretation of Section 2(b) and
the practical difficulties facing the Commission:
It is true that § 2(a) makes price discrimination unlawful only in case it lessens, or
tends to prevent, competition ..... But that is often hard to prove ..... Hence
-Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 131, 145 ('941).
2 Quantity Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 fli. L. Rev. 556 (i947); 6o
Harv. L. Rev. 1167 (947).
24

49 Stat. 1526 (I936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (94i).

as Section 2(b) specifies, in addition to the burden of proof provision, "That nothing contained [herein] shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that
his lower price ....was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."
266o Harv. L. Rev. 1167 (1947), noting the Morton Salt case; Smith, The Patman Act
in Practice, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 705, 710 (1937) (prediction that this literal construction would
not be adopted by courts); Changes in Federal Price Discrimination Law Effected by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 23 Va. L. Rev. 36, 319-2 (937); Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination
Act of I936, 23 Va. L. Rev. I4O, 165-66 (I936).
27148 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
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Congress adopted the common device in such cases of shifting the burden of proof to
anyone who sets two prices, and who probably knows why he has done so, and what
has been the result. If he can prove that the lower price did not prevent or tend to
prevent anyone from taking away the business; he will succeed, for the accuser will
not then have brought him within the statute at all. Nevertheless he may succeed even
though he fails to establish such a negative; for, although it will then appear that he
has lessened, or prevented, competition, the proviso of § 2(b) will still excuse him, if
he can show that his lower price did not undercut his competitors, but merely "met"
'
their "equally low price. 28
However, most courts have adopted a construction of Section 2(b) which
gives discrimination different meanings in Sections 2(a) and 2(b), requiring the
FTC to prove probable injury to competition as well as a mere price differential
in order to establish a prima-facie case. This interpretation, supported by the
history of the Robinson-Patman Act 29 and the use of the word "justification" in
Section 2(b), which indicates that an unlawful discrimination has already been
shown, 30 was used by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in earlier cases. 3 ' In
addition, the Commission's assumption of such a burden in two cases before the
Supreme Court was not disapproved by that Court. 32 , Judge Minton's dissent
in the Morton Salt case follows this view, with the finding of competitive injury
based on a permissible inference from the nature of the discrimination.3
But the most serious problem presented by the decision is not the strained
majority interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Even the topheavy burden placed on the FTC might be met 34 except for the complete lack of respect
28 Ibid.,

at 379.

29"Section 2(a) ....like present section 2 of the Clayton Act .... contains a general

prohibition against such discriminations, from which certain specified exceptions are then
carved, thus throwing upon any who claim the benefit of these exceptions the burden of showing that their case falls within them." S. Rep. 1502, 74 th Cong. 2d Sess., at 3 (1936).
3oBeer, Federal Trade Law and. Practice § 35 (i942); Zorn and Feldman, Federal Trade
Commission Hearings and the Robinson-Patman Act, 70 U.S. L. Rev. 62o, 626 (1936); Quantity Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 556, 559 (I947); Crowley.
Equal Price Treatment Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 3o6, 340 (i947);
Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 131, at 17o n. 92 (1941).
3r A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 144 F. 2d 221, 224 (C.C.A. 7th, i944); Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, r44 F. 2d 211, 217 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC
135 F. 2d 453, 455 (C.C.A. 7th, 1943); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. 2d

763, 768 (C.C.A. 7th, i930) (under old Clayton Act).
32FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 752-53 (i945); Corn Products Refining

Co.

v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738-41 (1945).

33The same process of inferring the requisite effect on competition from the nature of the

discrimination itself was followed by the Supreme Court in the Corn Products case. See text
at n. 17, supra. In the present case, Judge Minton was able to strengthen his dissenting posi-

tion by pointing to "abundant evidence in the record to support the finding."
34In the Morton Salt case, i) price differentials between competing purchasers were con-

cededly present. 2) In addition to a possible inference of injury to competition, the testimony
disclosed many instances of actual injury. 3) Cumulative discounts by definition do not neces-

sarily reflect actual savings in cost of sale or delivery. The customer who orders 5o,ooo cases of
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given the Commission's findings by the court. Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act provides that "The findings of the Commission as to the facts,
if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive."3s The Supreme Court last year.
declined to rule on the validity of a cumulative discount system similar to Morton's, stating: "The economic effects on competition of such discounts are for
the Trade Commission to judge. Until the Commission has determined the question, courts are not given guidance as to what the public interest does require
concerning the harm or benefit of these quantity discounts on the ultimate
public interests sought to be protected in the Act.' 6 In addition, the Court has
often reiterated the long-standing doctrine that "The appraisal of the evidence
and the inferences to be drawn from it are for the Commission, not the courts."37
Yet the Seventh Circuit Court, stating that "this provision as interpreted by
the Courts does not relieve the Commission of making a substantial showing
8
selected a small, inconclusive portion of the evidence,39
and proper findings,""3
drew from it an inference contrary to the Commission's findings, and set aside
the FTC's order as lacking substantial supporting evidence. Hostile decisions
like the instant one can only thwart the attempts of administrative tribunals to
carry out the mandates of Congress. The net result represents an unwise encroachment by the judiciary on the legislative function delegated to the FTC.4o
salt in a 12-month period may do so by placing fifty separate orders, each requiring separate
sales attention, handling, and shipping; another customer may buy 40,000 cases in ten orders.
Although the salt company's unit costs are lower in the latter case, only the former receives
the $.i5 per case rebate. 4) No contention was made that the price discriminations reflected
attempts to meet lower competitive prices.
3s38 Stat. 720 (1914), i5 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1941); cf. Clayton Act § 11,38 Stat. 734 (i914), 15

U.S.C.A.
36

§

21

(194).

Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 746 (1947).

37 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 76o (1945); cf. Corn Products Refining
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (I945); FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S.
112, 117 (i937); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 73 (1933); FTC v. Pacific
States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 63 (1927).
"8Morton Salt Co. v. FTC, 162 F. 2d 949, 958 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947).
39The court pointed to the fact that non-discount customers of the Morton Salt Co. in the
trade areas investigated showed increases in sales from z937-41, drawing the inference that
"the quantity discount system of petitioner tended to increase, not injure, competition."
Ibid., at 957- More careful analysis would have disclosed that total salt sales had also increased, and that there had been a shift in percentage of total sales toward discount customers. The possibility of conflicting conclusions emphasizes that the court exceeded its function by attempting any such analysis, careful or otherwise.
40 Contrast the attitude of the present court toward the Commission with that of Supreme
Court in FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. X12, 117 (1937):
"The courts do not have a right to ignore the plain mandate of the statute which makes the
findings of the Commission conclusive as to the facts if supported by testimony. The courts
cannot pick and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary to the findings of
the Commission."

